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The	role	of	analogy	in	language	acquisition	
Heike	Behrens1		
	
10.1	Introduction	Analogical	reasoning	is	a	powerful	processing	mechanism	that	allows	us	to	discover	similarities,	form	categories	and	extend	them	to	new	categories.	Since	similarities	can	be	detected	at	the	concrete	and	the	relational	levels,	analogy	is	in	principle	unbounded.	The	possibility	of	multiple	mapping	makes	analogy	a	very	powerful	mechanism,	but	leads	to	the	problem	that	it	is	hard	to	predict	which	analogies	will	actually	be	drawn.	This	indeterminacy	results	in	the	fact	that	analogy	is	often	invoked	as	an	explanandum	in	many	studies	in	linguistics,	language	acquisition,	and	the	study	of	language	change,	but	that	the	underlying	processes	are	hardly	ever	explained.	When	checking	the	index	of	current	textbooks	on	cognitive	linguistics	and	language	acquisition,	the	keyword	“analogy”	is	almost	completely	absent,	and	the	concept	is	typically	evoked	ad	hoc	to	explain	a	certain	phenomenon.	In	contrast,	in	work	on	language	change,	different	types	of	analogical	change	have	been	identified	and	have	become	technical	terms	to	refer	to	specific	phenomena,	such	as	analogical	levelling	when	irregular	forms	become	regularized	or	analogical	extension	when	new	items	become	part	of	a	category	(see	Bybee	2010:	66-69,	for	a	historical	review	of	the	use	of	the	term	in	language	change	and	grammaticalization	see	Traugott	&	Trousdale	2014:	37-38).			In	this	paper,	I	will	discuss	the	possible	effects	of	analogical	reasoning	for	linguistic	category	formation	from	an	emergentist	and	usage-based	perspective,	and	then	characterize	the	interaction	of	different	processes	of	analogical	reasoning	in	language	development,	with	a	special	focus	on	regular/irregular	morphology	and	argument	structure.	The	focus	on	language	acquisition	is	chosen	because	in	longitudinal	studies	on	language	development	we	can	trace	the	effect	of	analogical	reasoning	on	a	certain	linguistic	state	over	time.		I	will	conclude	with	a	discussion	on	the	similarities	and	differences	between	acquisition	and	change.		
10.2	 Definition:	What	is	analogy?	
10.2.1.	Analogical	reasoning	from	a	cognitive	science	perspective	Analogy	is	a	domain-general	form	of	structure	mapping	between	a	source	and	a	target	(Gentner	1983).	Such	mappings	can	be	based	on	perceptual	similarity	when	one	notices	the	similarity	between	two	blue	objects,	or	they	can	be	relational	when	one	sees	two	rows	of	three	different	objects	each	and	notices	that	two	of	these	objects	share	the	position	as	the	middle	one	without	being	physically	similar.	Markman	&	Gentner	(1993)	demonstrate	this	with	the	example	of	two	sets	of	three	geometrical	objects	in	a	row	(see																																																									1	I	would	like	to	thank	Dedre	Gentner,	Marianne	Hundt	and	Sandra	Mollin	for	their	thorough	and	insightful	comments	on	the	previous	versions	of	this	manuscript.	My	sincere	thanks	also	go	to	Catherine	Diederich	for	proofreading	the	first	version	of	this	chapter,	and	to	Julia	Voegelin	for	drawing	Figure	1.	
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Figure	1).	The	squares	in	Set	(a)	are	bigger	than	those	in	Set	(b):	The	medium-sized	square	in	Set	(b)	is	identical	in	size	to	the	smallest	square	in	Set	(a):	They	are	object	matches	because	they	share	the	same	perceptible	attributes.	By	contrast,	the	analogy	between	the	smallest	square	in	Set	(a)	and	the	small	square	in	Set	(b)	is	a	relational	one:	They	are	of	different	size,	but	they	are	both	the	smallest	in	their	set	(Markman	&	Gentner	1993).		
	Figure	1:	Perceptual	similarity	and	relational	analogy,	the	relevant	squares	are	distinguished	by	their	pattern.		To	give	a	linguistic	example,	mappings	can	be	based	on	physical	similarity	or	on	abstract	relations:	In	morphology,	we	find	patterns	based	on	physical	similarity	in	allophonic	variation,	where	a	stem	with	a	certain	coda	is	inflected	with	a	particular	allomorph.			Gentner	&	Smith	(2012:	131)	state	that	analogical	reasoning	involves	three	processes:			
• Retrieval:	Given	some	current	topic	in	the	working	memory,	a	person	may	be	reminded	of	a	prior	analogous	situation	in	the	long-term	memory.	
• Mapping:	Given	two	cases	present	in	the	working	memory	(either	through	analogical	retrieval	or	simply	through	encountering	two	cases	together),	mapping	involves	a	process	of	aligning	the	representations	and	projecting	inferences	from	one	analogue	to	the	other.	The	mapping	is	structure	consistent	and	systematic	because	it	concerns	large	relational	systems.2	
• Evaluation:	Once	an	analogical	mapping	has	been	done,	the	analogy	and	its	inferences	are	judged.		
	
10.2.2		 The	effect	of	analogy	on	perception		Analogical	reasoning	is	not	just	triggered	by	the	situations	we	perceive,	but	it	is	an	active	process	that	can	shape	our	perception.	The	ability	needed	to	draw	comparisons	is	
structural	alignment,	i.e.	to	notice	the	correspondences	between	elements.	Alignment	has	three	cognitive	effects	(Gentner	et	al.	2016):		
	(a)	It	makes	the	similarities	more	salient	and	leads	to	abstraction	and	transfer (Gentner																																																									2	Dedre	Gentner	(personal	communication)	explains	mapping	as	follows:	The	mapping	is	structurally	
consistent	(that	is,	it	has	one-to-one	correspondences	and	parallel	relational	structure).		It	favors	larger	and	
deeper	common	relational	systems	over	isolated	matches	(the	systematicity	principle).		
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&	Markman	1997).	 	(b)	It	promotes	the	noticing	of	alignable	differences.	For	example,	most	people	are	not	aware	of	a	basic	principle	in	engineering,	namely	that	diagonal	braces	render	a	construction	more	stable.	Gentner	et	al.	(2016)	had	adults	and	children	construct	skyscrapers,	most	of	which	collapsed	when	they	had	reached	a	certain	height.	In	one	experimental	condition,	children	were	asked	to	tell	which	of	two	buildings	(one	with	and	one	without	diagonal	strengthening)	was	stronger:	first	by	just	looking	at	them,	then	by	shaking	the	building.	In	the	subsequent	observational	study	of	their	building	activities,	they	had	aligned	the	perceptual	difference	without	explicit	instruction:	The	building	with	diagonal	braces	was	more	stable	than	that	without.	This	effect	was	even	stronger	when	the	critical	difference	was	the	only	difference	between	the	two	constructions.		(c)	It	invites	the	projection	of	inferences	from	the	base	(or	source)	domain	to	the	target	domain,	and	is	thus	instrumental	for	the	understanding	of	metaphors,	for	example.			Hofstadter	&	Sander	(2013)	argue	that	the	potential	for	analogical	reasoning	is	indeed	unbounded,	which	makes	them	the	“fuel	and	fire	of	thought”.	They	demonstrate	the	versatility	of	analogical	reasoning	for	words,	many	of	which	(like	band	or	chair)	carry	multiple	meanings	and	many	associations	from	their	contexts	of	use	with	them.	In	dictionary	approaches	to	meaning,	such	associations	and	meaning	extensions	cannot	be	considered,	yet	they	are	relevant	for	our	understanding	of	these	words	in	context.	Hofstadter	&	Sander	argue	that	the	flexibility	in	using	linguistic	units	and	in	understanding	such	flexible	usage	would	not	be	possible	if	meaning	was	fixed:		 And	the	fact	is	that	ordinary	words	don’t	have	just	two	or	three	but	an	unlimited	
number	of	meanings,	which	is	quite	a	scary	thought;	however,	the	more	positive	side	of	this	thought	is	that	each	concept	has	a	limitless	potential	for	variety.			 (Hofstadter	&	Sander	2013:	5)			What	follows	from	these	cognitive	approaches	to	analogy	is	that	analogical	reasoning	is	not	only	unconstrained	in	principle,	but	also	happens	“on	the	fly”	(Skousen	2002,	see	Section	10.3	below).	But	if	alignment	is	so	flexible,	how	can	we	predict	or	ascertain	which	analogies	are	actually	drawn	in	language	processing?	At	least	two	questions	arise:			 (a) Do	we	draw	all	possible	comparisons?	At	least	in	language	acquisition	research	it	seems	that	children	generalize	rather	conservatively.	How	relational	and	abstract	are	the	generalizations	we	make?	Do	we	draw	on	abstract	relational	principles	or	rules	to	generate	new	sentences,	or	do	we	exploit	constructional	patterns	with	some	degree	of	surface	regularity	and	lexical	specificity	as	well	as	semantic	grounding?	(b) What	guides	or	constrains	the	comparisons	we	make?	There	is	evidence	that	we	“overlook”	a	lot	of	possible	analogies.	What	influences	the	likelihood	with	which	we	make	a	particular	comparison?		The	findings	from	psychology	suggest	that	the	analogies	we	draw	spontaneously	are	rather	limited	and	often	based	on	surface	similarity.	First,	there	is	evidence	that	children	are	strongly	surface-oriented	even	when	comparisons	are	directly	presented	to	them	
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(Gentner	1988).		For	example,	if	a	4-5-year-old	is	asked	to	interpret	“How	is	a	cloud	like	a	sponge”,	they	say	‘both	are	round	and	fluffy’.		A	9-year-old	or	adult	will	say	‘both	hold	water	and	later	give	it	back’.	Gentner	(1988)	used	the	term	“relational	shift’	to	describe	this	shift	from	property-based	interoperation	to	relational	interpretation.		Second,	in	research	on	analogical	transfer	in	adults,	we	find	that	remindings	are	strongly	based	on	overall	similarity,	especially	surface	similarity.	Even	adults	fail	to	notice	and	use	past	analogs	that	only	share	relational	similarity	(Gentner,	Rattermann	&	Forbus	1993;	Gick	&	Holyoak	1980),	unless	they	are	frequent	enough	to	form	a	schema.	Bybee	(2010,	Chapter	4)	supports	the	importance	of	local	and	similarity-based	generalizations	when	reviewing	research	on	the	acquisition	of	syntax	that	shows	that	children’s	‘new’	utterances	differ	only	slightly	from	the	constructions	they	have	produced	before.		In	the	following,	I	will	focus	on	analogical	processes	in	morphology	and	syntax.	The	studies	reviewed	here	focus	on	category	internal	changes	(e.g.,	spread	of	regular	morphemes).	The	focus	will	be	on	theories	and	studies	in	language	acquisition		 	
10.3	 Analogical	processes	in	language	Analogical	processing	is	needed	when	assigning	new	exemplars	to	a	category,	or	when	extending	the	range	of	a	category.	While	some	theories	make	a	sharp	delineation	between	symbolic	and	rule-based	processes	that	rely	on	binary	category	assignment	(see	Section	10.4.1	below),	others	assume	that	categories	are	emergent,	dynamic,	and	–	importantly,	also	malleable.	Such	frameworks	include	connectionist	models	(Skousen	1989,	2002;	Skousen,	Lonsdale	&	Parkinson	2002),	exemplar	models	(Pierrehumbert	2001),	some	versions	of	construction	grammar	(Croft	2001),	and	usage-based	or	constructivist	models	of	language	(Beckner	et	al.	2009;	Bybee	2010;	Langacker	1987;	Tomasello	1998).	They	describe	how	categories	are	formed	when	a	new	item	is	associated	with	an	existing	category.		Analogical	relationships	play	a	crucial	role	in	this	process:		 Analogical	modeling,	on	the	other	hand,	does	not	have	a	training	stage	except	in	the	sense	that	one	must	obtain	a	database	of	occurrences.	Predictions	are	made	“on	the	fly”,	and	all	variables	are	considered	apriorily	equal	(with	certain	limitations	due	to	restrictions	on	short-term	memory).	The	significance	of	a	variable	is	determined	locally	–	that	is,	only	with	respect	to	the	given	context.	Gang	effects	are	related	to	the	location	of	the	given	context	and	the	amount	of	resulting	homogeneity	within	the	surrounding	contextual	space.	(Skousen	2002:	3)		The	internal	structure	of	such	categories	can	be	seen	as	one	of	more	or	less	closely	related	items:	In	an	exemplar	model,	each	category	is	represented	in	memory	by	a	large	cloud	of	remembered	tokens	of	that	category.	These	memories	are	organized	in	a	cognitive	map,	so	that	memories	of	highly	similar	instances	are	close	to	each	other	and	memories	of	dissimilar	instances	are	far	apart.	(Pierrehumbert	2001:	140)		This	clustering	of	related	exemplars	can	give	rise	to	prototype	effects	for	those	members	that	are	most	central	to	the	category	because	they	share	the	most	features	(Ibbotson	2013),	or	–	in	non-feature-based	terminology	–	are	high-frequency	representatives	of	
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the	typical	function	of	a	category	(O’Donnell,	Römer	&	Ellis	2013).	Prototypes	facilitate	the	association	of	new	members	with	a	particular	category,	and	may	serve	as	models	for	the	extension	of	that	category	(Goldberg	2006;	Ibbotson	&	Tomasello	2009).	For	example,	give	is	the	most	frequent	verb	used	in	the	ditransitive	double	object-construction	(give	John	a	book),	and	it	denotes	transfer	of	possession,	while	get	is	the	most	frequent	verb	used	in	ditransitive	constructions	with	prepositional	objects,	and	denotes	caused	motion/change	of	location	(get	the	ball	over	the	fence).	Corpus	analyses	as	well	as	association	experiments	and	language	development	data	show	that	this	relationship	holds,	although	it	is	not	completely	deterministic,	since	it	is	possible	to	encode	transfer	in	a	prepositional	construction	(give	the	book	to	John).	Goldberg	(2006:	89)	calls	this	the	Cognitive	Anchoring	Effect,	where	one	high-frequency	exemplar	can	serve	as	the	salient	standard	for	comparison.			
10.3.1		 The	role	of	analogy	in	category	formation	and	extension		Analogical	reasoning	leads	to	learning	in	terms	of	categorization,	abstraction	and	category	extension.	Langacker	(2000)	describes	these	processes	as	follows:		 The	cognizer	needs	the	ability	to	compare	two	structures	and	notice	discrepancies	as	well	as	similarity	or	overlap.	When	source	and	target	(the	new	item)	match	in	the	relevant	respects,	the	target	is	categorized	as	an	item	belonging	to	the	source	category.	(Langacker	2000:4)			This	definition	entails	that	each	comparison	allows	for	multiple	mappings,	which	in	turn	leads	to	categorization	in	multiple	dimensions.	For	example,	when	interpreting	a	novel	verb	form	like	gorped,	it	can	be	classified	as	a	past	tense	verb	based	on	its	position	and	meaning	in	an	utterance,	as	well	as	by	its	overlap	or	surface	similarity	with	the	–ed	suffix	of	other	past	tense	forms.	Another	form	like	glam	can	also	show	analogy	with	other	past	tense	forms	in	terms	of	its	position	and	meaning,	but	not	in	surface	similarity	with	the	regular	past	tense	suffix,	but	with	a	smaller	pattern	of	irregular	forms	(e.g.	swim-swam-
swum).	Such	slight	mismatches	between	source	and	target	lead	to	an	extension	of	the	category.	Ultimately,	the	past	tense	category	should	encompass	all	forms	and	the	analogical	mappings	that	hold	between	them.	Moreover,	such	a	category	should	be	flexible	because	new	markers	can	be	integrated,	and	the	weight	of	the	mappings	can	change.	Such	a	dynamic	model	of	categories	and	categorization	is	proposed	by	so-called	exemplar	models	(Barsalou,	Huttenlocher	&	Lamberts	1998).	The	example	of	the	past	tense	category	also	shows	that	analogical	mapping	goes	beyond	surface	similarities	even	if	they	are	available	in	that	speakers	make	choices	between	different	possibilities	(glum	vs.	glimmed).		According	to	Langacker,	analogy	leads	to	categorization.	For	language	acquisition,	I	will	link	the	concept	of	analogy	to	the	concepts	of	schematization	and	granularity	as	proposed	by	Langacker	(1987).	In	this	view,	children	need	to	direct	their	focus	from	detail	to	similarities	on	higher	levels	in	order	to	discover	schemas	and	more	abstract	relationships.	Gentner	&	Medina	(1988)	trained	children	to	make	such	progressive	
abstractions	by	drawing	their	attention	to	literal	similarity	matches	first,	and	then	highlighting	similarities	across	dimensions.		
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In	historical	linguistics,	two	aspects	of	analogical	reasoning	are	prominently	studied,	namely	proportional	analogies	and	analogical	levelling	(to	my	knowledge,	these	terms	are	not	prominently	used	in	the	acquisition	literature).	Proportional	analogies	describe	the	induction	by	exploiting	the	parallelism	of	three	examples	to	fill	the	gap	of	item	4	(walk	:	walked	:	go	:	goed).	This	regularization	can	also	be	an	example	of	analogical	levelling,	when	phonological	or	morphological	distinctions	are	diminished	due	to	a	more	general	regularization	process.	Bybee	&	Beckner	argue	that	these	cases	can	be	subsumed	under	frequency-induced	processes	of	categorization.	However,	de	Smet	&	Fischer	(this	volume)	correctly	point	out	that	while	analogy	is	part	of	any	categorization	process,	it	is	a	much	wider	concept	because	analogy	allows	for	multiple	mappings,	not	just	mappings	onto	existing	categories	(see	the	discussion	on	relational	analogies	above). They	follow	Traugott	(2011),	who	distinguishes	analogy	as	a	mechanism	or	process	of	thought,	from	analogization	as	the	product	of	analogical	reasoning	that	is	visible	as	a	new	stage	in	language	change.		
	While	both	historical	linguistics	and	language	acquisition	deal	with	change	in	language	use,	they	also	differ	in	important	dimensions:	In	language	change,	the	linguistic	conventions	or	structures	themselves	change	as	a	function	of	changing	preferences	in	the	language	community,	whereas	in	language	acquisition,	the	language	use	of	the	individual	child	changes	as	s/he	gradually	approximates	the	form-function	correspondences	of	the	ambient	language(s).	Hence,	the	outcome	is	quite	different.	Yet,	some	of	the	fundamental	questions	are	the	same.	They	concern	the	theoretical	debate	on	when	and	whether	speakers	process	language	by	“rule”,	which	would	allow	them	to	make	far-reaching	generalizations,	using	relational	analogies,	or	whether	developmental	change	is	a	rather	local	and	gradual	abstraction.	In	the	past	decades,	usage-based	studies	on	acquisition	have	accumulated	converging	evidence	from	a	number	of	different	phenomena	and	languages	to	show	how	local	generalizations	can	lead	to	a	more	wide-ranging,	rule-like	change.	In	the	following	sections,	I	will	discuss	the	theoretical	foundations	for	this	research	and	demonstrate	such	a	process	with	data	from	German	plural	acquisition.	In	sections	10.6	and	10.7,	I	will	try	to	systematize	similarities	and	differences	between	language	acquisition	and	language	change,	and	identify	some	open	questions	for	further	research.			
10.3.2		 Similarity	matches	versus	relational	matches		Linguistic	relations	can	be	complex,	or	–	in	the	terminology	of	usage-based	approaches	to	language	development	–	‘abstract’.	While	‘concrete’	relations	are	based	on	the	(partial)	physical	identity	of	linguistic	sequences,	‘abstract’	linguistic	relations	are	underlying	relations.	Even	infants	are	able	to	recognize	recurrent	patterns	in	nonsense	syllables.	Marcus,	Vijayan,	Bandi	Rao	&	Vishton	(1999)	exposed	7-month-old	infants	to	syllable	sequences	of	the	pattern	ABB	(e.g.	ga	ti	ti)	or	ABA	(e.g.	la	ni	la).	After	two	minutes	of	familiarization	(that	is,	hearing	the	same	pattern	again	and	again)	they	were	exposed	to	new	stimuli	with	the	same	or	a	different	pattern.	Infants	paid	more	attention	to	the	new	pattern.	Experiments	like	these	show	that	infants	are	able	to	recognize	familiar	patterns	and	distinguish	them	from	new	patterns,	even	if	the	concrete	elements	have	changed.		
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In	principle,	syntactic	rules	could	be	based	on	such	patterns.	The	following	sentences	do	not	share	a	single	concrete	realization	of	a	morpheme,	i.e.	they	have	no	surface	similarity,	but	they	have	the	same	underlying	structure,	e.g.	Agent	Action	Patient:		 (1) Kim	loves	Anna.	(2) Sophie	kissed	Jack.	(3) They	see	John.		This	example	illustrates	that	relational	analogies	exist	at	various	levels.	One	could	also	group	the	words	by	their	part-of-speech	category	(pronouns,	proper	names,	and	verbs).	Depending	on	the	language,	thematic	roles	like	Agent,	Action	and	Patient	are	systematically	linked	to	grammatical	functions	like	Subject,	Verb,	and	Object.	This	openness	makes	analogy	powerful	but	also	unbounded.	Since	analogical	reasoning	relies	on	both	the	discovery	of	physical	similarities	as	well	as	relational	ones,	multiple	analogical	mappings	are	possible	between	any	set	of	items	or	structures.	Consequently,	one	of	the	big	debates	in	language	acquisition,	and	to	a	lesser	extent	in	linguistic	theory	and	psycholinguistics,	is	at	what	level	such	structures	are	represented	(see	Section	10.4.1	below).	In	sum,	Gentner	&	Colhoun	(2010)	and	Gentner	&	Smith	(2012)	see	analogy	as	an	invitation	to	compare	and	to	draw	inferences	from	such	a	comparison.			 Reasoning	by	analogy	involves	identifying	a	common	relational	system	between	two	situations	and	generating	further	inferences	driven	by	these	commonalities.	The	commonalities	may	also	include	concrete	property	matches	between	the	situations,	but	this	is	not	necessary	for	analogy;	what	is	necessary	is	overlap	in	relational	structure.	(Gentner	&	Smith	2012:	130)		
	
10.4	 The	role	of	analogy	in	constructivist	theories	of	acquisition		Usage-based,	emergentist	and	constructivist	theories	of	acquisition	do	not	assume	a	genetic	predisposition	for	linguistic	categories,	or	a	priori	linguistic	representations.	Crosslinguistic	research	on	adult	linguistic	categories	has	shown	that	there	are	no	principled	constraints	on	grammatical	categorization	(Slobin	1997).	Crosslinguistic	research	has	also	shown	that	the	influence	of	language	on	children’s	emerging	categories	starts	early.	While	very	general	prelinguistic	concepts	or	biases	exist	that	influence	children’s	early	perception	and	categorization	before	language-specific	categorization	sets	in	(Mandler	2008),	the	process	of	“tuned	attention”	(Ellis	2006a,b;	Freudenthal,	Pine	&	Gobet	2009)	leads	children	to	discover	the	form-function	relationships	that	are	relevant	in	their	target	language(s).	This	entails	that	children's	linguistic	categories	are	emergent,	malleable,	and	shaped	by	the	input	language	(Bowerman	&	Choi	2003;	Majid,	Bowerman,	Kita,	Haun	&	Levinson	2004).			Construction	Grammar	has	become	the	dominant	syntactic	theory	for	modelling	such	usage-based	acquisition	processes,	and	it	is	also	applied	to	language	change	(e.g.,	Bybee	&	Beckner	2014).	While	there	is	typically	no	commitment	to	a	particular	version	of	construction	grammar,	acquisition	research	draws	on	the	general	assumptions	that	linguistic	units	are	symbolic	units	with	a	phonological	and	a	semantic	side,	and	that	similarities	hold	at	these	levels	(Croft	&	Cruse	2004).	Croft	and	Cruse	distinguish	between	phonological	alignment,	conceptual	alignment	and	symbolic	alignment.	Language	learning,	then,	is	based	on	generalization	from	one	instance	or	a	few	instances	
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to	many.	It	requires	intention	reading	and	pattern	finding	(Tomasello	2003).	Pattern	finding	requires	entrenchment	or	reinforcement	of	items	based	on	their	token	frequency.	This	memorization	is	the	prerequisite	for	noticing	similarities	between	items.	Conceptual	and	symbolic	alignment	require	detecting	the	form-function	alignment	of	symbolic	linguistic	units,	as	well	as	similarities	between	units	on	the	conceptual	level.	Conceptual	similarity	does	not	require	or	entail	formal	similarity.		In	the	following,	I	will	discuss	two	domains	with	a	rich	body	of	research	in	terms	of	analogical	reasoning.	First	I	will	discuss	the	acquisition	of	regular	and	irregular	morphology	with	respect	to	the	power	of	analogical	reasoning:	Is	it	possible	to	acquire	linguistic	rules	bottom-up	based	on	analogy,	or	do	linguistic	rules	require	top-down	declarative	processing?	Second,	the	acquisition	of	verb-argument	structure	will	serve	to	demonstrate	how	different	analogical	mappings	lead	to	a	refinement	of	the	form-function	correspondences	in	syntax.		
	
10.4.1	Linguistic	rules	without	analogy?	Learning	the	German	plural	
	According	to	Langacker	(2000:	219ff.),	linguistic	rules	can	be	conceived	of	as	schemas	with	few	constraints.	For	schema	formation,	the	resemblance	of	the	new	structure	to	the	source	structure	is	essential,	it	is	a	bottom-up	process	(Langacker	2008).	Langacker	(1987:	447)	argues	that	if	rules	are	conceived	as	schemas,	and	if	the	analogy	is	made	explicit,	there	is	no	difference	between	rule-based	and	schema-based	explanations,	e.g.	when	generalizing	from	search/searcher,	lecture/lecturer	and	so	forth	to	strive/striver	(cf.	the	relational	shift	in	analogical	reasoning	in	general	cognitive	processing	discussed	in	Section	10.3.1	above).			This	view	contrasts	with	the	top-down	processing	of	symbolic	rules,	as	proposed,	for	example,	by	Clahsen	(1999);	Marcus	et	al.	(1992);	Pinker	&	Prince	(1988)	and	Pinker	&	Ullman	(2002).	In	the	so-called	Dual	Mechanism	Model	of	inflection	(DMM),	symbolic	rules	apply	to	categories	as	a	whole	and	are	independent	of	other	processing	factors	such	as	frequency	or	analogy	(Pinker	&	Ullman	2002).	This	leads	to	a	difference	in	the	processing	of	regular	inflection,	where	the	regular	affix	or	default	affix	is	added	to	the	root	of	the	noun	or	verb	to	be	inflected,	and	irregular	forms,	which	are	stored	in	memory.	The	DMM	thus	reduces	the	memory	load	by	generating	regular	forms	through	the	generation	of	the	intended	form	by	a	symbolic,	top-down	rule.	In	order	to	explain	why	not	just	every	noun	will	receive	the	regular	plural,	an	additional	memory	component	is	needed	in	which	all	irregulars	are	stored.	Due	to	their	holistic	storage,	irregular	forms	are	subject	to	associative	processing	and	show	frequency	and	analogy	effects,	whereas	frequency	and	analogy	are	irrelevant	in	the	processing	of	regular	morphology,	if	there	is	a	strict	distinction	between	holistic	processing	by	memorization	for	irregulars,	and	combinatorial	processing	for	regular	forms	("item	and	process	model"	or	"words	and	rules";	cf.	Pinker	1999;	Huang	&	Pinker	2010).	Supposedly,	the	human	language	processor	is	innately	set	up	to	process	symbolic	rules	by	different	means	than	irregular	items	(Clahsen,	1999:	1007).		In	contrast,	as	noted	above,	constructivist	and	usage-based	approaches	to	acquisition	rely	heavily	on	the	storage	of	forms	for	entrenchment,	and	automatization	of	the	stored	form,	as	well	as	for	schematization:	Comparison	between	forms	is	only	possible	when	forms	are	stored.	Dual	mechanism	accounts	propose	that	learning	can	take	the	form	of	
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top-down	and	memory-independent	processing	when	the	child	can	identify	a	regular	affix.3	The	acquisition	of	German	plural	morphology	provides	a	good	testing	ground	for	these	processing	models,	because	productivity	and	frequency	are	not	confounded	(Clahsen	1999;	Clahsen	et	al.	1992).	The	low-frequency	-s	plural,	one	of	eight	plural	markers,	shows	the	fewest	constraints	in	its	occurrence	and	is	productive	with	new	and	nonce	nouns.	And	it	is	well	attested	that	the	German	-s	plural	is	overgeneralized	early,	despite	its	relative	low	frequency.	To	decide	between	the	validity	of	the	two	proposals,	the	critical	evidence	is	whether	all	German	plural	markers	are	overgeneralized	by	analogy,	or	whether	there	is	a	difference	between	the	-s	plural	and	the	other	affixes.	If	the	-s	plural	is	indeed	a	default	marker	that	is	applied	whenever	the	child	cannot	rely	on	stored	forms,	-s	should	be	overgeneralized	to	a	wide	range	of	noun	stems	and	not	be	constrained	by	analogy.		As	in	many	other	languages,	the	plural	system	in	German	is	determined	by	phonotactic	features	(syllable	structure,	final	sound),	and	gender	(Ravid	et	al.	2008).	German	has	four	plural	affixes	(-(e)n,	-e,	-er,	and	-e),	which	can	be	combined	with	vowel	raising	or	Umlaut,	as	well	as	a	substantial	group	of	nouns	that	do	not	mark	the	plural	(notably	masculine	and	neuter	nouns	ending	on	-el	and	-er).	The	-s	plural	is	taken	by	16.5%	nouns,	mainly	neuters	and	strong	masculines,	but	rarely	occurs	with	feminine	nouns	(Wegener	1999).	Mugdan	(1977)	estimates	that	about	75%	of	German	plurals	are	predictable	by	phonotactics,	declension	class	and	gender,	but	there	is	a	certain	degree	of	variation	between	possible	markers,	some	of	which	also	show	up	in	dialectal	variation.		The	Dual	Mechanism	Model	makes	the	claim	that	the	-s	plural	is	"morphonologically	free"	(Marcus,	Brinkmann,	Clahsen,	Wiese	&	Pinker	1995:	229),	and	that	it	represents	the	elsewhere	condition:	it	"appears	when	the	phonological	environment	does	not	permit	any	other	plural	allomorph"	(Marcus	et	al.	1995:	229;	see	also	Bornschein	&	Butt	1987:	142).	But	do	the	linguistic	facts	of	the	-s	plural	really	fulfil	this	condition?	It	turns	out	that	the	default	conditions	in	their	current	formulation	provide	an	insufficient	characterization	of	the	elsewhere	condition.	A	review	of	the	linguistic	facts	reveals	that	the	-s	plural	alternates	with	other	markers	in	all	domains.	The	-s	plural	can	occur	in	almost	all	phonological	surroundings	with	ordinary	nouns,	but	has	two	main	sets	of	applications:	First,	a	large	group	of	mostly	monosyllabic	nouns	that	end	in	plosives	(Deck-s,	Dock-s,	Trick-s,	Stopp-s,	Tipp-s;	please	note	that	these	words	are	not	borrowed	from	English,	but	are	part	of	the	common	ancestry).	In	this	phonological	condition	-s	alternates	with	the	(Umlaut)-e	plural	(e.g.	Zug	>	Züg-e	'train-s';	Boot	>	Boot-e	'boat-s').	Second,	the	-s	plural	is	commonly	used	when	the	noun	root	ends	in	an	unreduced	vowel	which	does	not	carry	the	main	stress	(e.g.	Oma-s	'grandma-s';	Auto-s	'car-s';	cf.	Bornschein	&	Butt	1987:	141).	However,	feminine	nouns	ending	with	-a	often	take	the	-n	plural,	sometimes	in	alternation	with	-s	(e.g.	Firma	>	Firm-en	/	Firma-s	'company-s';	Diva	
>	Div-en	/	Diva-s	'diva-s').	Such	alternations	are	also	found	in	default	conditions	like	proper	names	(e.g.	Corsa	>	Corsa-s	/	Cors-en;	a	product	name	of	a	car)	or	truncations	(e.g.	
Sozi-s	or	Soz-en	from	Sozialist-en	'socialist-s').	Finally,	when	the	noun	root	ends	with	a																																																									3	There	is	a	rich	debate	on	the	exact	nature	of	this	process.	Marcus	et	al.	(1992)	as	well	as	Clahsen,	Rothweiler,	Woest	&	Marcus	(1992)	proposed	that	there	are	so-called	default	conditions	which	help	the	child	to	identify	the	default	marker.	In	case	of	plurals,	the	default	marker	is	applied,	for	example,	to	proper	names	and	certain	types	of	nominalizations	or	conversion,	but	see	Goebel	&	Indefrey	(2000)	and	Dąbrowska	(2004:	116-158)	for	a	rebuttal	of	the	so-called	default	conditions.	
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stressed	full	vowel,	the	-s	plural	alternates	with	-n	or	-e	(e.g.	Café-s	versus	Phantasie-n	'fantasy-s'	versus	Knie-e	'knee-s';	cf.	Köpcke	1993;	Mugdan	1977;	Wegener	1999).		Most	importantly,	there	is	also	a	true	phonological	constraint	for	the	-s	plural:	Because	it	is	non-syllabic,	it	is	blocked	when	the	stem	itself	ends	in	sibilants	like	-s.	This	constraint	holds	in	all	default	conditions	like	proper	names	(e.g.	die	Thomas-se	'the	Thomas-es';	der	
Klaus	>	die	Kläuse	'the	Klaus-es'),	loan	words	(die	Boss-e	'the	boss-es'),	nominalizations	(die	Etwas-se	'the	something-s’),	or	acronyms	(die	MAZ-en;	see	Goebel	&	Indefrey	2000:	194).	Further	exceptions	to	default	processing	are	found	with	foreign	words	ending	on	the	pseudosuffix	-er.	They	do	not	receive	-s	marking,	but	are	zero-marked	as	common	for	native	nouns	ending	in	-er.	This	holds	even	if	they	preserve	their	English	pronunciation	as	in	Manager-0,	Computer-0,	Surfer-0	or	Jogger-0.		The	participant	of	this	study	is	a	monolingual	German	boy,	Leo,	who	grows	up	in	Leipzig,	Germany.	His	parents	have	higher	education	and	speak	dialect-free,	clearly	articulated	standard	High	German.	Leo's	language	development	was	recorded	from	age	1;11.13	(age	in	years;months.days),	the	onset	of	multiword	speech,	until	age	4.4	Analyzed	here	are	the	transcripts	of	317	one-hour	recordings	made	between	age	2;0.0	and	4;0.0,	as	well	as	the	diary	utterances	from	1;11.15	to	3;0.00.	The	corpus	contains	134,614	utterances	from	the	child	(including	6,249	diary	utterances)	with	a	total	of	76,612	nouns.	The	MLU	(mean	length	of	utterance)	in	words	increased	from	1.1	at	age	2;0	to	3.9	at	age	3;11	(for	comparison,	the	adults	have	an	MLU	of	about	5).	For	the	purpose	of	this	analysis,	all	nouns	were	coded	with	respect	to	the	plural	class	and	number.	In	addition,	errors	were	coded	in	terms	of	the	target	class	and	the	error	made.	There	is	a	total	of	367	errors,	117	of	which	are	errors	involving	the	wrong	use	of	the	-s	plural.	The	following	analysis	tests	whether	the	-s	plural	shows	the	fewest	constraints	as	predicted	by	the	Dual	Mechanism	Model.			The	second	and	major	argument	for	the	Dual	Mechanism	Model	is	that	default	markers	should	be	freely	generalizable	and	not	be	constrained	by	analogy	like	irregular	markers.	Furthermore,	they	should	be	used	on	default	conditions	whenever	access	to	memory	is	blocked.	In	concrete	terms	this	means	that	-s	errors	should	apply	to	nouns	of	all	other	plural	classes,	and	they	should	not	be	constrained	by	gender.	The	-s	plural	is	indeed	overgeneralized	to	nouns	of	several	other	plural	classes,	as	predicted	by	Clahsen	et	al.	(1992).	However,	this	holds	for	-en	and	-e	plurals	as	well.	In	order	to	show	that	-s	has	a	special	status,	one	needs	to	show	that	it	is	not	constrained	by	analogy	to	existing	-s	plurals.	This	will	be	tested	by	analyzing	the	phonotactic	properties	of	nouns	with	-s	errors.			The	117	error-tokens	with	-s	affect	44	different	noun	roots.	It	turns	out	that	-s	is	not	overgeneralized	to	all	kinds	of	stems,	but	rather	to	four	groups	of	nouns	which	can	be	characterized	by	their	final	sound	(see	table	1):	nouns	ending	in	liquids	(1.a)	or	nasals	(1.b),	as	well	as	nouns	ending	in	stops	(1.c)	or	unreduced	vowels	(1.d).	In	addition,	there	is	an	early	isolated	error	on	a	noun	ending	in	a	sibilant,	which	had	been	transcribed	with	a	question	mark	(1.e).	
																																																								4	For	more	detail,	see	Behrens	2006.	The	data	are	part	of	the	public	CHILDES	archive:	MacWhinney	(2000).	
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(1)	Distribution	of	-s	errors	with	respect	to	the	final	sound	of	the	noun	root		(a)	Nouns	ending	in	liquids			 -er	 Bagger-s	'excavator-s';	Zimmer-s	'room-s';	Lautsprecher-s	'loud+speaker-s',	
Käfer-s	'bug-s',	VW+Käfer-s	'VW+beetle-s',	Marienkäfer-s	'lady-bug-s,	
Teller-s	'plate-s',	Stopper-s	'stopper-s',	Roller-s	'scooter-s',	Koffer-s	'suitcase-s',	Laster-s	'truck-s',	Lokführer-s	'engine+driver-s',	Tiger-s,	
Hänger-s	'trailer-s',	Anhänger-s	'trailer-s',	Eimer-s	'bucket-s',	Container-s	'container-s';	Blinklicht-er-s	'flashlight-s'		 -el	 Wirbel-s	'swirl-s',	Pinsel-s	'paint	brush-es',	Onkel-s	'uncle-s',	Löffel-s	'spoon-
s',	Kamel-s	'camel-s',	Deckel-s	'lid-s',	Äpfel-s	'apple-s'		 -r	 Tür-s	'door-s',	Stinktier-s	'skunk-s',	Stör-s	'sturgeon',	Dinosaurier-s	'dinosaur-s'			 -l	 Ball-s	'ball-s',	Wohnmobil-s	'motor	home-s',	Strahl-es	'beam-s',	Steckerl-s	'pin-s	(in	a	game)'		 (b) Nouns	endings	in	nasals		-en	 Gueterwagen-s	'freight	car-s';	Kesselwagen-s	'tank+waggon';	Modellwagen-s	'model	car-s';	Maenneken-s	'little+men-s';	Bilderrahmen-s	'picture	frame-s',	
Düse-n-s	'nozzle-s',	Buchstabe-n-s	'letter-s'		 -n	 Strassenbahn-s	'street	car-s';	Trambahn-s	'street	car-s';	U+Bahn-s	'subway-
s';	S+Bahn-s	'street-car-s;	Modell+Eisenbahn-s	'model	railroad-s';	
Eisenbahn-s	'railroad-s'		 -ng	 Verpackung-s	'packaging-s',	Schmetterling-s	'butterfly-s','		 -m	 Form-s	'form-s';	Muffinform-s	'muffin	form-s'			 (c)		 Nouns	ending	in	velar	stops		 	 	 Fabrik-s	'factory-s',	Zug-s	'train-s',			 (d)		 Nouns	ending	in	stressed	full	vowels:			 	 Papagei-s	'parrot-s',	Geweih-s	'antler-s'			 (e)	 Others		 	 Bussas	(?)	‘busses’
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	Contrary	to	the	hypothesis	that	-s	errors	should	not	be	constrained	to	analogy,	these	phonotactic	patterns	correspond	to	existing	-s	plurals.	In	the	plural	nouns	produced	by	the	child,	the	-s	plural	is	found	with	liquids	(e.g.	Hotel-s,	Onkel-s,	Tunnel-s),	nasals	(Clown-s,	Bonbon-s	'candy-s',	Tram-s	'street	car-s',	Tandem-s),	plosives	(Lok-s),	or	stressed	full	vowels	(Café-s).	The	only	error	pattern	which	apparently	cannot	result	from	analogy	is	the	overgeneralization	of	the	-s	plural	to	nouns	ending	in	-(e)r.	However,	the	final	-r	is	not	pronounced	[tyːɐ̯],	and	it	is	possible	that	children	misanalyze	the	ending	as	a	full	vowel	(Szagun	2001;	for	theoretical	support	see	Vennemann	1972	and	Wiese	1996:	252ff.).	In	sum,	this	rather	narrow	distribution	does	not	suggest	that	-s	is	scattered	across	the	whole	morphonological	space	by	rule,	as	claimed	by	Marcus	et	al.	(1995:	245).	Also,	the	data	do	not	suggest	that	the	-s	plural	instantiates	the	"elsewhere	condition"	of	being	used	when	no	other	marker	can	apply.	Instead,	-s	errors	are	not	exclusive	in	these	conditions,	but	compete	with	-(e)n	or	-e	errors	(cf.	1a-e	above).		 	 	It	is	also	informative	to	look	at	the	time	course	in	which	different	types	of	-s	errors	appear.	Initially,	there	are	mainly	errors	on	nouns	ending	on	-er	and	-el,	where	-s	errors	alternate	with	-n	errors.	Errors	on	nasals,	the	second	major	group,	come	in	only	eight	months	later	at	age	2;8,	and	errors	on	plosives	follow	at	2;9.	The	gradual	extension	of	error	domains	suggests	that	the	child	acquires	the	phonological	freedom	of	the	-s	plural	in	a	stepwise	fashion.		The	acquisition	data	presented	here	support	claims	that	type	frequency	is	not	the	sole	determinant	of	productive	inflection,	but	that	analogy	is	another	critical	factor	(cf.	Goebel	&	Indefrey	2000	and	Hahn	&	Nakisa	2000	for	related	results	in	connectionist	modelling	of	the	German	plural;	and	Dąbrowska	2001,	2004,	2012	for	analogical	processes	in	acquiring	the	Polish	genitive,	as	well	as	individual	differences	in	older	speakers).		 	The	research	on	the	acquisition	of	inflectional	morphology	also	shows	that	children	draw	on	different	sources	of	information	for	their	generalizations:	They	gather	information	about	allomorphic	variation	(within	one	month	after	his	first	plural	production,	the	German	boy	Leo	had	identified	and	overgeneralized	all	German	plural	affixes,	cf.	Behrens	2002).	Like	all	other	German	children	whose	plural	acquisition	was	studied,	his	overgeneralization	errors	were	not	coincidental,	but	fell	in	the	realm	of	the	errors	that	can	be	expected	based	on	the	phonological	and	prosodic	properties	of	the	stem	(Ravid	et	al.	2008),	and	the	resulting	errors	correspond	to	the	prototypical	plural	schemas	or	Gestalt	(Bittner	&	Köpcke	2001;	Köpcke	1998).	In	sum,	the	German	plural	system	is	not	determined	by	a	single	generalization,	but	it	is	a	system	with	internal	variability	and	a	number	of	more	or	less	reliable	subregularities.	Children	make	use	of	analogies	on	several	levels	when	learning	the	system:	They	have	to	identify	the	functional	equivalence	of	the	different	allomorphs	(affix-orientation),	they	identify	the	phonotactic	properties	of	the	stem	and	form	predictions	about	appropriate	plural	markers	(stem-orientation)	and	they	derive	knowledge	about	the	prosodic	and	phonotactic	properties	of	the	resulting	inflected	form	(product-	or	schema-orientation).	This	allows	them	to	identify	the	highly	regular	aspects	of	the	system	with	very	low	error	rates,	and	to	make	non-random	choices	in	the	less	regular	domains	of	the	system	(Behrens	2011).	Given	the	complexity	of	the	system,	a	continuing	process	of	calibration	can	be	observed	since	children	also	have	to	learn	to	disentangle	the	interaction	of	plural	marking	with	case	and	gender	marking	(Behrens	2011;	Szagun	2001,	2006;	Szagun,	Stumper,	Sondag	&	Franik	2007).	
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10.5	 	The	acquisition	of	argument	structure:	From	concrete	to	abstract	
representations	Another	domain	in	which	there	is	rich	research	on	the	nature	of	generalization	is	argument	structure,	or	the	contingency	between	semantic	and	syntactic	information	as	well	as	the	influence	of	concrete	strings	of	linguistic	units	and	their	frequency.		In	usage-based	linguistics,	the	key	finding	is	that	children	do	not	operate	with	general	‘rules’	and	abstract	categories,	but	learn	by	making	generalizations	over	the	input	they	receive.	In	the	terminology	used	in	this	framework,	children	proceed	from	concrete	to	abstract	representations.	“Concrete”	here	refers	to	the	replication	of	strings	of	words	or	chunks	without	having	analyzed	their	internal	structure.	Abstraction	results	from	repeatedly	registering	commonalities	between	exemplars	such	that	these	commonalities	are	reinforced	(Langacker	2000:	5).	For	example,	forms	like	faked,	borrowed,	hated,	
burped	and	so	forth	have	a	dental	suffix	(-ed)	to	denote	past	tense	that	has	three	phonologically	conditioned	allomorphs.	The	repeated	encounter	of	forms	inflected	with	–ed	will	lead	to	the	analysis	and	segmentation	of	the	inflected	forms	and	will	allow	speakers	to	then	integrate	new	items	into	a	morphological	paradigm.	Schematization	is	a	special	form	of	abstraction	since	we	can	compare	items	at	different	levels	of	specificity	or	granularity	when	we	notice		analogies	at	different	levels	of	abstractness	(Langacker	2000).	In	contrast	to	abstract	rules,	schemas	always	start	out	with	concrete	similarities	in	the	expression,	as	they	are	based	on	concrete	usage	events	(Langacker,	2008:	219-220).	Tomasello	(1992)	analyzed	the	early	verb	use	of	an	English-speaking	child	and	demonstrated	that	early	verb	syntax	was	item-specific	and	did	not	generalize	to	other	verbs	of	the	same	argument	structure	class.	The	argument	structure	of	such	“verb-islands”	is	thus	better	characterized	by	thematic	roles	such	as	hitter/hittee	or	
kisser/kissee	than	by	more	abstract	roles	such	as	agent/patient	and/or	subject/object.	In	the	initial	phase	of	syntax	acquisition,	no	transfer	of	knowledge	between	syntactically	similar	verbs	seems	to	take	place,	and	abstract	categorical	links	between	constructions	seem	to	be	absent	(but	see	Naigles,	Hoff	&	Vear	2009).		Subsequent	research	has	employed	a	number	of	methods	both	in	experimental	investigations	and	in	corpus	analyses	of	naturalistic	data	to	explore	the	extent	to	which	children	generalize	over	the	form-function	correspondences	in	the	input.	Although	these	studies	rarely	use	the	term	“analogy”,	the	findings	can	be	framed	in	terms	of	analogical	reasoning	nonetheless,	as	Ibbotson	(2013:	10)	states:		 A	key	part	of	responding	to	this	challenge	will	be	to	specify	in	greater	detail	the	mechanisms	of	generalization,	specifically	a	mechanistic	account	of	the	dimensions	over	which	children	and	adults	make	(and	do	not	make)	analogies.	As	usage-based	approaches	have	argued,	relational	structure,	and	mapping	between	representations	is	a	fundamental	psychological	process	that	underpins	forming	these	abstract	connections.		Analogy	thus	plays	a	central	role	in	the	acquisition	of	language	because	children	have	to	develop	from	mappings	based	on	observable	similarities.	For	example,	activities	in	which	an	agent	manipulates	an	object	are	typically	encoded	by	transitive	verbs	(Slobin	1985).	Languages	differ	as	to	which	cues	encode	that	relationship:	morphology	(case	marking),	semantics	(agency)	or	syntax	(word	order).	Research	within	the	Competition	Model	has	shown	that	the	order	in	which	children	acquire	the	different	facets	of	argument	structure	generalizations	depends	on	the	availability	and	reliability	of	these	
	 14	
cues	in	the	input	(Bates	&	MacWhinney	1987;	Bates	et	al.	1984;	MacWhinney	2004).	In	the	following,	I	will	present	a	selection	of	the	rich	acquisition	literature	to	demonstrate	how	children	develop	from	string-oriented,	concrete	units	to	more	abstract	generalizations	based	on	the	syntax	or	semantics	of	certain	constructions,	and	how	this	accumulated	knowledge	prevents	them	from	making	possible	generalizations	when	there	is	a	well	established	alternative	(pre-emption).				
10.5.1 String-based	processing		The	hypothesis	that	early	child	language	is	item-based	emphasize	the	role	of	concrete	linguistic	strings.	Such	strings	can	mark	the	beginning	of	utterances	and	determine	their	pragmatics,	or	they	can	take	the	form	of	slot-and-frame	patterns	with	open	slots,	also	in	middle	position.	I	call	these	processes	“string-based”	because	the	linguistic	units	that	serve	as	the	anchor	for	developing	constructions	may	not	have	been	fully	analysed	by	the	children.	Utterance-initial	strings	are	important	in	question	formation	and	in	the	acquisition	of	auxiliaries.	Here,	children	start	out	with	very	few	utterance-initial	patterns	(wh-word+pronoun	or	pronoun+auxiliary)	that	encode	certain	semantic	functions	before	acquiring	the	complete	paradigm	(Cameron-Faulkner,	Lieven	&	Tomasello	2003;	Lieven	2008;	Rowland,	Pine,	Lieven	&	Theakston	2003).	Similar	processes	can	be	observed	when	children	acquire	complex	sentences.	Again,	they	start	out	with	a	few	strings	(e.g.	I	think,	you	know)	that	are	not	used	with	their	full	semantics	but	serve	as	an	evidentiality	marker	instead.	Gradually,	children	acquire	the	full	paradigm	as	well	as	the	full	semantics	with	independent	propositions	in	the	matrix	and	the	complement	clause	(Brandt,	Kidd,	Lieven	&	Tomasello	2009;	Diessel	2004).		But	not	only	sentence	onsets	are	relevant	for	detecting	syntactic	patterns	and	their	functions.	Children	also	detect	stable	frames	with	variable	slots	that	can	be	filled	by	increasingly	variable	material.	Such	slot-and-frame	patterns	(Braine	1976)	or	low-scope	formulae	(Pine	&	Lieven	1993)	can	also	act	as	anchors	for	future	development.	In	morphology,	such	patterns	are	referred	to	as	frequent	morphological	frames	(Erkelens	2009;	Mintz	2003).	They	can	serve	as	the	basis	for	developing	word	classes.			
10.5.2		Syntax-based	processing		A	major	research	question	concerns	the	productivity	of	children’s	emerging	linguistic	knowledge.	In	corpus	analyses	of	naturalistic	developmental	data	one	typically	studies	the	degree	of	overlap	between	syntactically	related	constructions:		The	more	overlap,	the	more	lexical-specificity,	the	less	overlap,	the	more	variability	and	productivity.	This	relationship	has	also	been	explored	experimentally.	In	a	training	study	with	low-frequency	verbs,	Childers	and	Tomasello	(2001)	found	that	it	is	easier	for	children	to	acquire	new	structures	if	the	frame	of	the	construction	is	kept	constant	(by	pronouns	rather	than	variable	full	NPs).		In	a	priming	study	with	passive	sentences,	Savage,	Lieven,	Theakston	&	Tomasello	(2003)	showed	that	younger	children	were	only	able	to	produce	new	passives	with	the	same	verb	(lexical	priming),	whereas	older	children	were	also	able	to	produce	passives	with	new	lexical	material	(syntactic	priming).	A	similar	reliance	on	similarity	in	priming	for	4-year-olds,	but	not	older	children,	was	found	by	Goldwater	&	Echols	(2011).		
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Similar	evidence	for	the	growing	abstractness	of	children’s	syntactic	generalizations	comes	from	studies	in	the	so-called	“weird	word	order	paradigm”.	When	children	hear	a	new	verb	as	a	description	of	a	transitive	action,	the	2-year-olds	tended	to	copy	the	attested	frame	even	if	the	word	order	is	atypical	(VSO:	dacking	Elmo	the	car,	or	SOV:	
Elmo	the	car	gopping),	whereas	the	4-year-olds	consistently	corrected	the	utterances	to	SVO	word	order	(Akhtar	1999).	Studies	like	these	show	the	development	from	exemplar-based	processing	to	more	abstract	generalizations	in	which	form-function	correspondences	have	been	learnt.		To	trace	form-function	correspondences	also	helps	to	learn	semantics.	In	their	syntactic	
bootstrapping	hypothesis,	Gleitman	(1990)	and	Fisher	(1996)	argued	that	children	need	to	keep	track	of	different	uses	of	a	verb	in	order	to	come	to	a	fine-grained	understanding	of	its	meaning.	Such	form-function	correlations	can	also	be	exploited	in	a	different	direction.	Coercion	describes	the	process	by	which	a	verb	assumes	the	meaning	of	the	construction,	as	in	sneeze	the	napkin	off	the	table	(Goldberg	2006).			
10.5.3	Semantics-based	processing	
	The	vast	body	of	first	language	acquisition	research	focuses	on	the	formal	productivity	of	particular	inflectional	paradigms	or	argument	structure	constructions.	It	is	less	clear	which	mechanisms	help	the	child	to	generalize	across	constructions	(but	see	Abbot-Smith	&	Behrens	2006;	Elman	2003).	To	this	end,	a	functional	analysis	is	required	as	well.	In	particular,	the	child	needs	to	work	out	in	what	respect	the	constructions	differ	from	one	another,	and	whether	and	how	the	transfer	of	knowledge	between	constructions	is	constrained	(cf.	the	research	on	argument	structure	overgeneralizations,	e.g.	Bowerman	&	Brown	2006).	Put	in	terms	of	analogy,	this	means	that	children	will	have	to	work	out	what	is	the	same	or	different	between	similar	constructions	in	order	to	avoid	overgeneralization	errors.	This	question	relates	to	a	much	debated	topic	in	the	usage-based	language	change	literature	that	study	how	certain	constructions	emancipate	themselves	from	their	source	construction	through	changes	in	the	usage	pattern	(see,	for	example,	Hilpert’s	visualization	of	verb	to	noun	conversion	in	English,	Hilpert	2011:	445	and	447).	Here,	speakers	have	to	become	aware	of	the	range	of	uses	of	the	new	constructions	as	opposed	to	the	form-meaning	pairing	of	the	old	construction.	Regarding	language	acquisition,	I	will	focus	on	two	research	paradigms	that	explore	the	semantic	basis	of	generalization:	research	on	functional	equivalents	in	so-called	variation	sets,	and	research	on	novel	verb	learning	in	the	Artificial	Language	Learning	paradigm.		
	In	so-called	variation	sets,	the	function	held	is	constant	but	the	formal	encoding	varies	(Küntay	&	Slobin	2002).	Such	sequences	are	used	as	reformulations	or	recasts	when	the	child	does	not	seem	to	understand	the	utterances	in	(2):		(2)		 Father	to	son,	age	2;3	
Who	did	we	see	when	we	went	to	the	store?	
Who	did	we	see?	
Who	did	we	see	in	the	store?	
Who	did	we	see	today?	
When	we	went	out	shopping,	who	did	we	see?		
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Typically	such	variation	sets	keep	some	elements	stable	and	vary	others,	which	can	help	the	child	to	discover	the	formal	and	functional	relationships	between	different	constructions.	In	addition,	the	contextual	embedding	of	such	variation	sets	helps	the	child	to	identify	the	form-function	pairings.	Ibbotson	(2013:	19)	calls	variation	sets	“powerful	cross-sentential	cues	to	generalization”	and	reports	findings	from	Waterfall	(2006	)	that	about	20-80%	of	English	child-directed	speech	consists	of	variation	sets	(the	percentage	depends	on	the	criteria	of	the	distance	between	items	that	are	considered	to	be	part	of	a	”set”),	and	that	children’s	use	of	verbs	that	occurred	in	variation	sets	was	more	appropriate.	These	findings	stress	the	importance	of	syntactic	variation	for	specifying	verb	meaning(s)	(see	the	discussion	of	syntactic	bootstrapping	above).		While	studies	on	variation	sets	exploit	the	effect	of	variation	in	naturalistic	data,	experiments	in	the	Artificial	Language	Learning	paradigm	with	children	and	adults	investigate	what	constrains	speakers’	generalizations	when	they	are	confronted	with	novel	verbs	in	a	familiar	construction,	or	with	novel	verbs	in	novel	constructions.	How	readily	do	they	transfer	their	existing	knowledge	to	new	items	or	constructions?	In	recent	studies,	Suttle	&	Goldberg	(2011)	and	Robenalt	&	Goldberg	(2015)	provided	further	evidence	for	the	influence	of	semantics	on	learner’s	generalizations.	Suttle	&	Goldberg	(2011)	found	that	speakers	are	more	confident	about	new	uses	of	words	when	they	fall	within	the	semantic	space	typically	encoded	by	that	construction.	Robenalt	&	Goldberg	(2015)	demonstrated	that	learners	are	less	likely	to	accept	a	new	use	of	a	high-frequency	verb	if	there	is	an	alternative	expression	(pre-emption).	This	suggests	that	speakers	tend	to	prefer	familiar	phrases,	but	accept	creative	uses	more	readily	when	there	is	no	established	alternative	(see	also	Abbot-Smith	&	Behrens	2006	for	related	findings	on	the	generalization	of	auxiliaries	in	present	perfect,	passive	and	future	constructions).				
10.6	Conclusions		Psycholinguistics	deals	with	online	processing	in	comprehension	and	production.	Experiments	such	as	the	ones	reviewed	in	sections	10.2	can	inform	us	about	the	inferences	that	participants	can	draw	given	the	evidence	they	get.	Analogical	reasoning	is	considered	to	be	a	very	fundamental	process	that	contributes	to	human	categorization	in	general,	and	–	more	specifically	–	to	the	lines	along	which	we	extend	categories.	Thus,	analogy	has	also	become	a	prominent	concept	in	explaining	the	processes	by	which	grammatical	categories	or	lexical	items	change	over	time	(section	10.3).	However,	studies	on	the	structure	of	language	are	typically	offline	as	they	can	only	compare	synchronic	varieties	and	their	change.	In	order	to	study	the	mechanisms	that	lead	to	developmental	change,	language	acquisition	data	could	provide	insights	into	the	online	processing	of	linguistic	information	by	language	learners,	as	well	as	the	effect	of	this	processing	on	the	developing	system.		Regarding	language	acquisition,	the	focus	of	usage-based	research	on	language	development	lies	on	the	social	and	general	cognitive	learning	mechanisms	children	use	to	detect	and	abstract	the	grammatical	patterns	found	in	their	input	language	(Behrens	2009;	Ibbotson	2013;	Tomasello	2003).	Research	has	shown	that	children	tend	to	start	out	with	local,	item-based	generalizations	but	acquire	more	abstract	relations	readily	when	the	form-function	relationships	are	transparent.	In	doing	so,	they	exploit	analogy	at	the	item-based,	syntactic	and	semantic	level.		
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	First,	there	is	reason	to	assume	that	analogical	reasoning	is	a	major	driving	force	both	in	acquisition	and	change,	because	it	allows	speakers	to	integrate	new	items	into	existing	categories,	or	extend	the	category	based	on	similarities	and	perhaps	even	relational	analogies.	This	leads	to	certain	similarities	between	language	change	and	language	acquisition:	Children	are	better	with	regular	form-function	mapping,	and	in	historical	development,	we	often	observe	regularization	processes,	for	example	in	the	change	from	forming	past	tense	by	vowel	shift	to	forming	it	with	a	dental	suffix	(see	above).	In	German	plural	formation,	highly	predictable	classes	do	not	pose	problems	for	children,	whereas	error	rates	are	high	when	the	system	allows	several	markers,	as	is	the	case	for	monosyllabic	masculine	and	neuter	nouns	(e.g.,	the	contrast	between	Park-s	or	Pärk-e	
‘park-s’	or	Tunnel	or	Tunnel-s	‘tunnels’,	where	Tunnel-s	is	typical	for	Southern	varieties	of	German,	and	Pärk-e	is	the	Swiss	German	variety).	Thus	is	seems	that	the	range	of	overgeneralization	errors	resembles	the	outcome	of	historical	change	as	evidenced	in	current	variation.		Second,	change	seems	to	be	small	and	gradual,	and	often	item-specific	in	the	beginning.	Bybee	(2014,	Chapter	4)	discusses	how	children’s	generalizations	stick	closely	to	the	established	categories.	This	is	confirmed	by	the	data	presented	above:	Although	the	same	plural	errors	are	found	in	several	acquisition	corpora,	children	in	the	end	coalesce	with	the	adult	system.	However,	their	errors	provide	evidence	for	possible	lines	of	generalization	by	analogy.	It	seems	that	in	order	for	a	change	to	take	effect	in	the	system	itself,	the	conventions	of	a	speech	community	have	to	be	changed.	In	language	history,	this,	too,	is	an	extended	and	gradual	process.	Rosemeyer	(2016)	analyses	the	change	in	the	auxiliary	selection	in	Spanish	between	1270	and	1699,	when	an	increase	of		haber	‘have’	at	the	expense	of	ser	‘be’	was	observed.	Mixed-model	analyses	that	take	the	aspectual	properties	of	verbs	as	main	variables	show	that	non-directional	and	non-telic	verbs	are	first	affected	by	the	change,	before	it	affects	directional	and	telic	verbs.	In	the	end,	only	a	few	verbs	with	high	token	frequency	withstand	the	change	Rosemeyer	argues	that	this	change	in	auxiliary	selection	preferences	is	first	driven	by	salience,	because	the	new	usages	are	very	notable,	until	well	attested	frequency	mechanisms	set	in	(cf.	Hilpert,	this	volume):	Increasing	type	frequency	for	the	new	patterns	drives	the	change	further,	whereas	high	token	frequency	leads	to	remanence	or	“the	temporary	persistence	of	a	replaced	construction	in	a	usage	context	due	to	processes	of	social	conventionalization“	(Rosemeyer	2016:	183).	Fischer	(2007,	Chapter	3)	argues	that	analogical	changes	is	a	reanalysis	of	form-function	associations	that	takes	place	within	an	analogical	grid:			 I	would	argue	that	analogy	is	primary	or	at	least	stands	on	an	equal	footing	with	reanalysis	since	a	reanalysis,	both	a	semantic-pragmatic	and	a	structural	one,	takes	place	within	the	contours	of	the	communicative	situation	and	the	grammatical	system	in	which	a	structure	operates.	The	reanalysis	will	therefore	also	be	confined	and	shaped	by	the	formal	structures	that	already	exist.	My	hypothesis	is	that	a	reanalysis	of	a	structure	will	not	as	a	rule	result	in	a	totally	new	structure,	but	in	one	that	is	already	in	use	elsewhere.	(Fischer	2007:		123)		Despite	these	similarities	in	the	processes	that	lead	to	change	in	the	linguistic	system	of	the	individual	or	the	language	community,	there	are	critical	differences	between	acquisition	and	change	(see	Diessel	2011,	2012	for	additional	evidence).	In	grammaticalization	processes,	lexical	items	become	grammatical	functors,	such	as	the	verb	go	in	English,	which	went	through	semantic	bleaching	such	that	its	progressive	
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form	became	an	auxiliary	to	denote	intention	(going	to).	But	although	children	tend	to	acquire	lexical	items	before	function	items,	it	is	not	the	case	that	their	ontogenetic	development	has	to	mirror	historical	development.	I.e.,	they	do	not	need	to	acquire	the	full	lexical	semantics	before	they	can	learn	the	bleached	and	grammatizised	meaning.	Instead,	whether	children	learn	the	lexical	verb	go	before	the	future	marker	depends	on	the	distribution	of	these	forms	in	the	input.	In	German,	gehen	is	still	a	lexical	verb,	and	its	use	as	an	intention	marker	is	relatively	rare	and	still	involves	motion	(i.e.,	it	has	a	smaller	functional	range	than	its	English	or	Dutch	counterpart).	Consequently,	children	acquire	gehen	as	a	lexical	verb	first	(Behrens	2003).	But	a	comparison	with	Dutch	(Behrens	2003)	and	English	data	(Theakston	et	al.	2002)	shows	that	children	do	not	learn	the	auxiliary	sense	from	the	lexical	verb.	In	these	languages,	gaan	and	go	are	predominantly	used	as	auxiliaries,	and	the	auxiliary	use	is	early.	Go/gaan/gehen	are	polysemous	and	polyfunctional	verbs	in	these	three	closely	related	languages,	and	each	language	shows	a	different	distribution	of	these	functions.	If	language	development	mirrored	historical	change,	we	would	expect	similar	developmental	trajectories.	Instead,	we	find	language-specific	and	verb-island-like	development:	children	acquire	different	form-function	clusters	or	constructions	in	their	respective	target	language,	depending	on	the	frequency	and	function	as	attested	in	the	target	language.				Furthermore,	historical	language	change	changes	the	system	used	by	the	linguistic	community,	whereas	in	the	individual’s	ontogenetic	language	change	through	language	acquisition	the	learner	typically	approximates	that	system.	So	how	can	we	try	to	integrate	this	discrepancy	between	supposedly	similar	processes	that	account	for	different	outcomes?	In	the	following	section,	I	will	review	two	strands	of	research	that	may	help	to	identify	the	crucial	processing	factors	further.		
10.6 Discussion	and	outlook		One	line	of	research	that	tries	to	explain	the	mechanisms	of	change	is	social,	since	language	change	is	a	process	that	is	mediated	between	the	individual	and	his/her	speech	community.	Here,	the	major	difference	between	language	learning	and	historical	language	change	seems	to	be	the	target	of	development,	because	language	change	concerns	the	changing	linguistic	preferences	of	a	language	community,	whereas	first	language	acquisition	looks	at	the	change	within	an	individual	as	s/he	tries	to	approximate	his/her	language	to	the	way	it	is	used	by	his/her	environment.	Although	many	children	make	the	same	errors	(e.g.,	go-ed	for	went),	and	may	resist	counterevidence	or	even	corrections	for	a	while,	they	ultimately	give	in	to	the	conventional	language	use	of	the	majority.	The	case	is	more	complex	with	children	growing	up	multilingually	because	they	actually	have	a	choice	and	can,	for	example,	refuse	to	speak	one	of	the	languages	they	are	exposed	to	(de	Houwer	2007).	Motivational	aspects	and	questions	of	identity	thus	have	a	big	influence	in	language	use	and	learning	outcome	of	second	language	learners	and	bilinguals.	However,	there	is	no	evidence	that	children	seem	to	drive	language	change	(see	Lieven,	this	volume).			A	second	line	of	research	looks	at	the	effect	of	time	or	experience	on	processing.	So	far,	I	have	focussed	on	analogy.	But	the	kinds	of	analogies	we	draw	are	not	only	determined	by	degrees	of	similarity,	but	by	other	processing	factors	such	as	frequency	and	recency,	but	also	perceptual	salience.	Furthermore,	there	is	developmental	change	in	the	individual	mind,	as	well	as	in	the	system	used	by	the	speech	community.	How	could	this	possible	interaction	between	analogical	reasoning,	salience	and	frequency	look	like?		
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The	contribution	of	analogy	is	twofold:		It	lets	us	categorize	new	experiences	with	existing	ones,	but	also	observe	similarities	to	other	categories,	and	form	the	relation	of	an	element	to	several	categories	(e.g.,	in	the	case	of	plural	development	we	do	not	see	errors	on	the	100%	predictable	nouns	on	schwa,	but	a	lot	of	variation	on	those	groups	of	nouns	that	have	similar	phonotactics	properties	of	the	noun	stem,	but	different	plural	markers.	Here,	the	child	has	observed	the	analogy	of	a	certain	noun	to	several	plural	classes.		Analogy	also	leads	to	innovation,	if	a	speaker	creates	a	new	form	(but	note	that	innovation	does	not	need	to	be	based	on	analogy).	As	discussed	in	the	cognitive	science	literature	above	(see	Section	10.2),	a	spread	of	such	an	analogy	based	innovation	will	be	particularly	successful	if	the	analogical	link	is	promoted	and	made	salient.		The	contribution	of	salience	is	twofold,	too:	First,	items	can	have	lower	or	higher	
perceptual	salience,	the	ease	with	which	an	item	can	be	observed,	for	example	because	of	its	prosodic	highlighting	and	its	phonetic	substance:	Unreduced	segments	are	easier	to	perceive	than	reduced	ones	(see	Traugott,	this	volume,	and	Ellis	this	volume).	But	salience	also	relates	to	expectancy,	or	frequency-based	inferences:	Surprisal	refers	to	the	fact	that	an	item	may	be	salient	because	we	do	not	expect	it	in	this	context.	Whereas	perceptual	salience	seems	to	pertain	to	the	psychophysical	prominence	of	a	segment,	surprisal	seems	to	pertain	to	the	semantic	salience	since	it	is	context	dependent	(cf.	Section	10.5	above	and	the	discussion	in	Traugott,	this	volume;	and	Ellis,	Section	1.3,	this	volume).			Frequency	effects,	finally,	are	multifold,	too:	The	differential	effect	of	type	and	token	frequency	(entrenchment	versus	learning	and	change	from	variation)	has	been	much	discussed	(Bybee	2010),	but	becomes	more	complicated	because	this	is	a	dynamic	relationship	over	time.	Time	plays	a	role	in	the	dispersion	of	the	tokens	over	time	(cf.	the	discussion	of	dispersion	and	burstiness	in	Hilpert,	this	volume,	Section	3.5),	but	also	in	the	accumulated	experience	of	an	individual	over	time	(see		Baayen,	this	volume),	where	growing	experience	leads	to	a	continuous	change	in	the	type	and	token	relationships	that	have	been	registered.			It	follows	that	the	interaction	between	analogical	reasoning,	salience	and	frequency	are	complex,	but	can	be	modelled	with	new	theories	and	methods.		In	recent	years,	researchers	from	different	fields	proposed	models	that	see	both	the	individual	and	the	collective	linguistic	system	as	dynamic	or	complex	adaptive	systems	(Beckner	et	al.	2009;	van	Geert	&	Steenbeek	2005;	de	Bot,	Lowe,	Thorne	&	Verspoor	2013).	They	argue	that	all	processing	factors	interact,	and	that	the	outcome	of	this	interaction	depends	on	the	individual’s	current	cognitive	state.	Hence,	the	initial	state	in	the	language	learner	is	not	knowing	the	language.	Over	time	s/he	accumulates	more	and	more	evidence	based	on	the	input	they	hear	(typically	a	relatively	stable	synchronic	state),	and	approximates	that	state.	Thus,	successful	first	language	acquisition	typically	consolidates	the	state	of	the	system.	In	language	change,	however,	a	relatively	stable	state	disintegrates	over	time	and	consolidates	on	a	new	state	because	more	and	more	speakers	use	the	new	form-function	patterning.			By	combining	methods	like	analyses	of	complex	developmental/historical	databases	and	insights	from	language	learning	as	well	as	language	changes,	we	can	specify	the	outcome	of	the	interaction	of	different	processing	factors	on	a	given	state.	This	is	the	aim	of	current	models	that	try	to	explain	language	evolution	and	change	as	well	as	first	and	second	language	acquisition	(see	also	MacWhinney	202,	Christiansen	&	Chater	2016).		
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